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KIDNAPPINGS AS A TERRORIST INSTRUMENT OF AQIM AND THE MUJAO
ABSTRACT: This article updates to the Spring of 2013 the kidnappings implemented by a 
number of Salafist-Jihadist groups acting in the Maghreb, the Sahel, and Nigeria, providing 
analysis. Since then, a number of hostages have been released and other foreigners have 
been kidnapped, but the key-issues defining the terrorist groups’ strategies remain. The 
threat is always there, and their most negative consequences (payment of ransoms and 
release of Jihadist-Salafist prisoners, among others) do remain as well.
KEYWORDS: AQIM; Algeria; Ansaru; Boko Haram; In Amenas; Jihadist-Salafist 
terrorism; kidnappings; Libya; Maghreb; Mali; MUJAO; Niger; Nigeria; ramsons; Sahel; 
SGPC (GSPC, in its more frequent French acronym);  Tunisia.
LOS SECUESTROS COMO INSTRUMENTO TERRORISTA DE AQMI Y DEL MUYAO
RESUMEN: Este artículo analiza el estado de la cuestión en la primavera de 2013 de los 
secuestros realizados por grupos yihadistas salafistas en el Magreb, el Sahel y Nigeria. 
Desde entonces algunos rehenes han sido liberados y otros secuestrados, pero los elementos 
claves relacionados con la estrategia de los grupos terroristas siguen siendo los mismos. 
La amenaza perdura en esta dimensión, y las lacras que produce – en forma de pagos de 
rescates o de liberación de yihadistas presos, entre otras - también.
PALABRAS CLAVE: AQMI;  Ansaru; Argelia; Boko Haram; GSPC;  In Amenas;  Libia; 
Magreb; Malí; MUYAO; Níger; Nigeria; rescates; Sahel; secuestros; terrorismo yihadista 
salafista; Túnez.
LES ENLEVEMENTS, UN INSTRUMENT TERRORISTE DE L’ AQMI ET DU MUJAO
RESUME : Cet article met au jour dans le printemps 2013 et analyse les enlevements 
des hotages par les groupes Jihadistes-Salafistes actifs au Maghreb, au Sahel et dans le 
Nigéria. Suite à çe moment, quelques hotages ont été liberés et des autres kidnappés, mais 
les clefs pour definer les strategies des groups terroristes restent les memes. La menace 
reste toujours là, et ses consequences les plus negatives (parmis des autres, le virement des 
rançons et la liberation des prisonniers Jihadistes) restent aussi.
MOTS CLEFS : AQMI; Algérie; Ansaru; Boko Haram; enlevements; GSPC; In Amenas; 
Libye; Maghreb; Mali; MUJAO; Niger; Nigeria; raçons; Sahel; terrorisme djihadiste-
salafiste, Tunisie.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This article is providing analysis related to the ‘Al Qaida in the Lands of  Islamic 
Maghreb’ (AQIM) and the ‘Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa’ (MUJAO, 
in its French acronym) strategies of  kidnappings implemented in the Maghreb and in the 
Sahel. The scenario is including Mali and Niger, in the Sahel, and Algeria, Mauritania and 
Tunisia, in the Maghreb, but is also involving neighbouring countries, such as Nigeria or 
Cameroon. A number of  references to the Nigerian Jihadist groups, Boko Haram and 
Ansaru, is obligged due to the increasing interaction among all these groups on the basis 
of  the model provided by AQIM.
In recent years Jihadist Salafist groups acting in the area are more intent than ever 
to use kidnappings as a terrorist instrument. A huge region and the presence of  Western 
citizens acting as aid workers, mining and oil companies’ employees, or tourists, make 
virtually impossible to keep all these potential targets out of  danger. Algeria is the key 
country, as the place where the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC, in its 
French acronym) inaugurated this practice in 2003.
Ten years after an initial massive kidnapping of  32 hostages, two terrorist groups – 
AQIM and MUJAO – have in-herited the GSPC’s activism in the area, both focusing in 
terrorist attacks and kidnapping for ransom activities. The latter continues remaining a 
threat with operations earning perpetrators between US$50 million and US$90 million 
in revenue in this period.4 Together with AQIM and MUJAO, other groups also acting in 
the region (mainly Boko Haram and Ansaru), are emerging as emulators.
II. THE GSPC AND AQIM: THE CENTRAL ACTORS
In April 2013, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the mastermind behind the In Amenas hostage 
crisis in Algeria, was one of  the leaders in the Algerian GSPC faction that took 32 
European hostages in southern Algeria. After an Algerian military operation near 
Tamanrasset, 17 of  the hostages were freed. The rest of  the hostages were freed in 
northern Mali in August 2003, except for one German woman who died in the desert. 
A $5 million euro ransom was paid. Ironically, the ransom mediator who was appointed 
by the Malian government was Iyad ag Ghali, the present leader of  the AQIM-linked 
Ansar Eddine.5
In January 2007, the GSPC was renamed AQIM. One year later, the group began 
to conduct regular kidnappings. Since 2008, AQIM has regularly engaged in kidnapping 
4 See Algeria: In Amenas BP JV Wet Gas Facility Attack 16-20 January 2013, Unclassified OSINT 
V1.1.210113, p. 3, in <www.sevenquestions.co.uk>.
5 “Happy End”, Jeune Afrique/l’Intelligent, Number 2224, August, 24-30, 2003, p. 15.
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operations in Mali and Niger in the Sahel as well as Tunisia, Algeria and Mauritania in 
the Maghreb. AQIM has earned millions of  euros through ransoming Western hostages. 
More recently, it has begun to demand the release of  jihadist prisoners as well. Northern 
Mali has been the core territory from where large-scale raids have been launched, as well 
as where militants have held hostages and negotiated ransoms.6
On February 22, 2008, AQIM kidnapped two Austrian tourists in southern Tunisia. 
In December 2008, it kidnapped two Canadian diplomats in northern Niger, including 
UN Special Envoy to Niger Robert Fowler. These kidnappings reflected both AQIM’s 
regional connections and transnational ambitions.7
In January 2009, AQIM kidnapped four European tourists in Mali. In November 
2009, it kidnapped three Spanish aid workers from Mauritania.8 The release of  the 
Spanish aid workers was linked to a payment of  7 million euros, as well as Mauritania’s 
extradition to Mali of  Sid Ahmed Ould Hamma, who sentenced to a 12-year prison term 
in Nouakchott only two months prior.9 In the summer of  2011, Ould Hamma was linked 
to a Boko Haram incident in Nigeria.
On September 16, 2010, AQIM five French, one Togolese and one Malgache 
hostages at a uranium mine in Arlit, Niger. The two Africans and a Frenchwoman were 
released in February 2011. On November 20, a French national was kidnapped in Kayes, 
Mali. On January 7, 2011, AQIM kidnapped two French nationals in Niamey, Niger, and 
they were killed by AQIM the next day after French forces attempted to rescue them near 
the Malian border.10 On February 4, 2011, an Italian tourist and her Algerian driver were 
kidnapped in Djanet in southern Algeria, and freed on April 17, 2012. On September 
24, 2011, two French nationals were kidnapped in Hombori, Mali, and in December 
five European tourists were kidnapped in Timbuktu, in which one German national was 
killed.11
This chronology is useful to provide a global vision of  the transnational projection 
6 STEWART, S., “The Unspectacular, Unsophisticated Algerian Hostage Crisis”, Stratfor, January, 24, 2013, 
pages 1 and 2, in <www.stratfor.com>. Since 2008-2009 northern Mali has been central for AQIM in terms 
of terrorist financing issues and as a safe heaven in general. See US Department of State: Country Reports on 
Terrorism 2009. Mali, in <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2009/140883.htm>.
7 See GUIDÈRE, M., La tentation internationale d’ Al Qaïda au Maghreb, Paris-Brussels, IFRI&Centre des 
Études de Sécurité, December 2008, p. 17.
8 CEMBRERO, I., “El ‘afable’ terrorista y portavoz de Al Qaeda”, El País Digital, December 18, 2012, in 
<www.elpais.es>.
9 See “Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity”, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 3, Number 9, September 2010, p. 23, and 
ECHEVERRIA, C., “Yihadismo: escenarios africanos”, Análisis del Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos (GEES), 
July 29, 2011, in <www.gees.org>.
10 Belmokhtar was the responsible of this frustrated kidnapping. See “AQMI. Nigériens et français se 
concertent”, Jeune Afrique, Number 2611, January, 23-29, 2011, p. 11.
11 ECHEVERRIA, C., Sobre la necesidad de asegurar el Sahel, Análisis GEES, November 11, 2011, in <www.
gees.org>.
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of  the terrorists, their increasing use of  violence, the focus on French nationals and 
interests, and finally the growing number of  non-French nationals who have become 
victims.
Kidnapping Westerners in southern Tunisia, in Arlit, Niger, or in the most important 
road in Mauritania (that connecting Nouadhibu and Nouakchott), among other places, 
demonstrated the terrorists’ ability to operate hundreds of  kilometers from their core 
territory in northern Mali. AQIM’s ‘modus operandi’ also indicates that terrorists prefer 
to kidnap more than one person because having multiple hostages allow them to kill 
one of  them to make pressure for the ransom of  the others. They also prefer to release 
women as soon as possible. Belmokhtar and Abdelhamid Abu Zeid—the first is suposed 
to have been killed in Mali and the death of  the second was confirmed by France—have 
been the mean protagonists of  these kidnappings. Abu Zeid was considered one of  the 
most violent jihadist leaders in the region, linked to the executions of  two European 
hostages, a British and a French, in 2009 and 2010.
The terrorists communicate mainly through ‘Agence Nouakchott d’ Information’ 
and they use mediators in the ransom negotiations. One of  them is Mustafa Ould 
Limam Chafi, who negotiated many of  AQIM’s hostage ransoms, including the release 
of  Robert Fowler in 2008. Chafi and the Mauritanian news agency were also used by 
the group responsible for the May 2011 kidnappings in Nigeria – see below - suggesting 
that they had close ties with AQIM. This Mauritanian agency has also been used by the 
Belmokhtar’s group during the January 2013 attack on the In Amenas plant. Belmokhtar 
has been waging for years an AQIM operative and, since October 2012, became the 
leader of  its own group, named “Those Who Sign With Blood”.12 In fact, discussions 
about the real loyalty of  Belmokhtar, to AQIM or only to himself, are difficult to fully 
understand. Belmokhtar’s group claimed responsibility for the In Amenas attack.13 The 
terrorists demanded since the beginning the end of  the French operations in Mali and 
the release of  more than 100 prisoners from Algerian prisons as well as Jihadist global 
leaders such as Aafia Siddiqui and Omar Abd Al Rahman.14
III. MOVEMENT FOR ONENESS AND JIHAD IN WEST AFRICA (MUJAO) AND THE 
NIGERIANS BOKO HARAM AND ANSARU, AS AQIM’S EMULATORS
MUJAO is an AQIM’s splinter based in northern Mali that is believed to be mostly 
made up of  non Algerian fighters (mainly Mauritanians and local Malians belonging 
12  In October 2012, AQIM announced it had ‘suspended’ Belmokhtar from command.
13 FISHER, M., “Looking for al-Qaeda in Algeria”, WorldViews the Washington Post Foreign Staff, January 
22, 2013, in <www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/views/wp/2013/01/22/looking-for-al-qaeda-in-algeria/>.
14 Op cit.
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to the Songhai tribe). MUJAO paid attention to kidnapping for ransom practice since 
2011, when the group was born. Then, MUJAO kidnapped three European aid workers 
in Tindouf, Algeria, on October 23, 2011. In April 2012 this group kidnapped seven 
Algerian diplomats at their Consulate in Gao, and one Portuguese in December also in 
northern Mali.15
Concerning the Algerian hostages, three were released and the Vice-Consul, Tahar 
Touati, was killed. In April 2013, three Algerian diplomats and the Portuguese remain 
in the hands of  MUJAO.16 This group has focused its attacks on Algerian interests (two 
suicide attacks in the Algerian territory, in Tamanrasset and Ouargla, in 2012, and the 
kidnappings in Tindouf  and Gao) but its projection is regional, acting in northern Mali, 
mainly in the Gao region.
MUJAO is not the only group that has emulated the AQIM’s practice of   kidnapping 
in the region.17 In May 2011, ‘Al Qaida in the Lands Beyond the Sahel’ claimed the 
kidnapping of  a British and an Italian in the first kidnapping of  Westerners in Nigeria. 
The terrorists sent a video in December 2011 and demanded 5 million of  euros following 
the AQIM’s strategy. The two hostages were killed by the terrorists in March 2012, in 
the context of  a Nigerian & British operation to release them.18 Also in Nigeria, on 
December 19, 2012 thirty members of  Ansaru, a splinter group of  Boko Haram that 
officially emerged in 2012 but is considered connected to the May 2011 kidnappings, 
attacked a ‘Vergnet Co.’ facility in Katsina, closed to the Niger border, and kidnapped a 
French engineer.
In the third week of  February 2013, 14 foreign nationals were kidnapped in northern 
Nigeria and Cameroon in two separate actions. Seven workers of  the Lebanese company 
“Setraco” were kidnapped in Jamare, northern state of  Bauchi, Nigeria, and on March 
11, Ansaru claimed their execution.19 Seven members of  a French family were kidnapped 
by Boko Haram near the Nigerian border in Cameroon on February 19, 2013.20 Up 
to this kidnapping, Boko Haram had only included Nigerian targets and acted only in 
15 See DENÉCÉ, E., Forces spéciales et groupes d’intervention antiterroristes algériens, Paris, Bulletin de 
Documentation Numèro 5 du Centre Français de Recherche sur le Renseignement Cf2R, January 2013, p. 7.
16 “Medelci à propos des otages algériens au Mali: “Pas de garantie qu’ ils soient en vie”, El Watan (Algeria), 
April 2, 2013, in <www.elwatan.com>.
17 See the list of foreigners kidnapped by AQIM and the MUJAO along 2012 in Alexander, Yonah, Terrorism 
in North Africa&the Sahel in 2012, Arlington VA, Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies-Potomac Institute 
for Policy Studies, February 2013, p. 27.
18 ORDAZ, P., “Italia pide explicaciones a Reino Unido por la muerte de un rehén en Nigeria”, El País, 
March 10, 2012, p. 8.
19 See “Nigeria: une video sur Internet affirme montrer les corps d’otages d’Ansaru”, El Watan (Algeria),March, 
11, 2013, in <www.elwatan.com>.
20 CEMBRERO, I,, “Un grupo radical rapta en Camerún a una familia con cuatro menores”, El País, February 
20, 2013, p. 8.
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the Nigerian territory avoiding kidnappings. Once again, a chronology of  kidnappings 
is useful in order to demonstrate than the ‘AQIM model’ is becoming central in the 
strategies of  an increasing number of  terrorist groups acting in the region.
MUJAO is defined as a split of  AQIM, Ansaru as a split of  Boko Haram, and the 
Belmokhtar group as a split of  AQIM. In fact, interaction among them is frequent, 
provoking confusion among analysts and security officials. For instance, Mohamed 
Amine Bencheneb, who was killed by the Algerian forces in the In Amenas plant, was 
involved in the Tindouf  kidnapping in October 2011 reflecting a connection between 
MUJAO and the Belmokhtar group splitted from AQIM in 2012.21
The kidnapping and killing of  Western nationals by the four groups, and the 
MUJAO and Boko Haram kidnappings in Algeria and Cameroon are reflecting not only 
specialization but also a reinforcement of  their trans-border ambitions. Ansaru had 
kidnapped foreigners, and is increasing its activities attacking nationals including military 
involved with the intervention in Mali.22
IV. CONCLUSIONS
AQIM remains active and central in its criminal enterprise of  kidnapping for ransom 
to finance their operations. The “Serval Operation” is seriously undermining the means 
of  Jihadist-Salafist groups, but up to now it has not been able to release the hostages 
remaining in the hands of  AQIM and MUJAO in Mali. One of  the French hostages in 
the hands of  AQIM, Philipe Verdon, who was kidnapped in northern Mali in September 
2011, is even supposed to have been killed in March.23 Concerning Ansaru and Boko 
Haram, most recent kidnappings are significant shifts in these groups’ targets and tactics.
Kipnappings before and after the French&African military intervention in northern 
Mali are a dense web of  overlapping, and sometimes contradictory, questions and 
mysteries about not only AQIM, MUJAO and the Nigerian Jihadist organizations as 
such groups, but also about particular individuals such as Belmokhtar, Abu Zeid, and 
others. The complexity of  trying to understand the kidnapping strategies of  them, and 
the connections among these groups, doesn’t mean that there is no connection, but it 
does make it difficult to evaluate. The ability of  these terrorist groups for keeping their 
hostages in the context of  the military offensive initiated on January 11 indicates that the 
threat remains in the region.
21 See Cf2R: “In Amenas, January 16, 2013, ouvert par la radio”, Renseigneur Alerte, January 27, 2013, p. 2, 
in <http://twitter.com/renseignor>
22 See BEY, M., TACK, S., “The Rise of a New Nigerian Militant Group”, Stratfor, February 21, 2013, in 
<www.stratfor.com>.
23 “Mali: AQMI annonce l’ exécution d’ un otage français, Paris ne confirme pas”, El Watan (Algeria), March 
20. 2013, in <www.elwatan.com>.
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